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ABSTRACT 
 
The Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) acquisition program is a 
joint Air Force and Navy effort led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) to demonstrate a networked system of unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) 
to effectively and affordably prosecute 21st century combat missions.  The potential of 
these weapon systems to perform dangerous combat missions at a relatively low-cost and 
low-risk has garnered significant interest from both Congress and the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and raised expectations that the J-UCAS will replace some of the DoD’s 
aging tactical aircraft fleet.  This paper will address the requirement for the DoD and 
Armed Services to collectively resolve a new vision and clear strategy for the integration 
of unmanned combat air vehicles into the Armed Forces and the future battlespace. 
The DoD and Armed Services continue to struggle among themselves and with 
defense contractors to match resources and requirements in the development of individual 
“service-centric” UCAVs for specific mission areas.  The current vision and strategy of 
the J-UCAS program is derived from an initial assessment of the cost and risk benefits of 
UCAV development.  The failure of this approach is that it will not yield a UCAV with a 
distinct strategic and operational advantage.  This research will trace the evolution of the 
current J-UCAS acquisition program.  A systems-engineering approach will be applied to 
a reassessment of the desired J-UCAS mission requirements and corresponding 
performance capabilities that will serve to guide the development of critical aviation 
systems in the context of current and emerging technologies. 
 v 
It was concluded that while the J-UCAS program should remain a joint effort, the 
United States Air Force (USAF) should be given the priority on developing and fielding 
the first operational joint UCAV weapon system.  Future J-UCAS weapon systems 
should be designed to operate in a joint environment within the emerging global 
command and control architecture in coordination with manned aircraft.  The J-UCAS 
must be designed with flexible, multi-mission capability to include intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; suppression of enemy air defenses and strike.  The 
other armed services should support this effort, but initially limit their contributions to 
evaluating technology demonstrators that primarily focus on interoperability in each of 
their respective combat environments until such time as the first operational UCAV 
program has successfully proven its combat effectiveness.
 vi 
PREFACE 
 
Disclaimer 
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this 
document are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the 
University of Tennessee Space Institute.  They do not reflect the official position of the 
United States Navy, Department of Defense or U.S. Government.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) are in pursuit of the goal of 
developing a fleet of unmanned aircraft that can reduce both defense costs and aircrew 
losses in combat by taking on the most dangerous aerial combat missions.  The 
tremendous potential of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) is widely recognized 
and allies as well as potential adversaries are moving quickly to mount their own research 
and development programs.   In the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act, 
Congress set a goal that by 2010, one-third of DoD’s strike force should be unmanned in 
order to perform dangerous combat missions. 1  As we approach the halfway mark, it is 
becoming increasingly more apparent that this goal will not be realized.  The DoD and 
Armed Services continue to struggle among themselves and with defense contractors to 
match resources and requirements in the development of individual “service-centric” 
UCAVs for a variety of specific mission areas. 
It is envisioned that UCAV weapon systems have the earmarks of becoming one 
of the most predominant technologies to ever transform the U.S. military across the full 
spectrum of conventional combat operations from peacekeeping to regional warfare.  
UCAVs have the potential to satisfy current mission requirements including intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and 
strike. 2  They will be inherently more flexible than cruise missiles in time-sensitive target 
selection and more readily expendable in high-risk environments than manned systems.  
                                                        
1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (GAO-04-530T), Washington D.C.: 17 
March 2004, 3-4. 
2 Ibid. 
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They could even have a greater sustained battle presence than both missiles and manned 
systems.  The potential also exists for UCAVs to perform other more routine missions 
including command, control, and communications (C3) or even more intense missions 
such as close air support (CAS) of ground forces and even air-to-air combat. 3  Perhaps 
someday UCAVs will join the air defense arsenal against strategic ballistic missiles and 
tactical cruise missiles.  One thing is certain, as with the development of any new science 
and technology, the only definitive limitations on future UCAV capabilities will be those 
we chose to place on them ourselves. 
The DoD has recently implemented sweeping reform changes to influence the 
UCAV program to adhere to the original Congressional timeline established by the 2001 
Defense Authorization Act.  These changes include the consolidation of Air Force and 
Navy UCAV program efforts under the direction of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency and the establishment of a Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems 
Program Office.  Notwithstanding these recent developments, the perceived pressure to 
adhere to an ostensibly arbitrary timeline is raising questions as to whether this approach 
is in the best interests of our Armed Forces and if it will result in a UCAV that provides a 
distinct strategic and operational advantage? 
As recent as this fiscal year 2005 Defense Appropriations Bill, Congress voted to 
drastically reduce defense funding to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems program 
by $200 million over concerns that “the program had not been properly coordinated with 
                                                        
3 Ibid. The close air support (CAS) mission is a highly specialized strike mission performed by combat 
aircraft under the direct or indirect control of ground or airborne forward air control (FAC) personnel in 
direct support and in close proximity to friendly ground forces.  The air-air combat mission involves 
combat between one or more opposing aircraft in direct or indirect confrontation with each other. 
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the Armed Services, was overly ambitious, and potentially unaffordable.” 4  Questions 
continue to be raised regarding the UCAVs potential to replace manned aircraft and the 
challenges of integration with manned aircraft.  The motivation behind this paper is born 
out of this struggle and guided by the desire to provide some new insight for the DoD and 
Armed Services to collectively resolve a new vision and clear strategy for the integration 
of unmanned combat air vehicles into the Armed Forces and the future battlespace.
                                                        
4 J-UCAS Research, Development, Test & Evaluation appropriation funding reduced by $200 million from 
$710.4 to $514.4 million dollars. See Department of Defense Appeal, FY 2005 Defense Appropriation Bill. 
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CHAPTER I 
OVERVIEW 
 
The Joint Unmanned Combat Air System 
The Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) acquisition program is a 
joint Air Force and Navy effort led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) to demonstrate the technical feasibility, military utility, and operational value 
of a networked system of UCAVs to effectively and affordably prosecute 21st century 
combat missions, including suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), 
surveillance/reconnaissance, and precision strike within the emerging global command 
and control architecture. 5  The potential of the UCAV weapon system to perform 
dangerous combat missions at a relatively low-cost and low-risk has garnered significant 
interest from both Congress and DoD and raised expectations that the UCAV will replace 
some of the DoD’s aging tactical aircraft fleet.  This paper will address the requirement 
for the DoD and Armed Services to collectively resolve a new vision and clear strategy 
for the J-UCAS acquisition program that will serve to guide the integration of unmanned 
combat air vehicles into the Armed Forces and the future battlespace. 
 
Current J-UCAS program vision and strategy 
The DoD and Armed Services continue to struggle among themselves and with 
defense contractors to match resources and requirements in the development of individual 
                                                        
5 “Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS),” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) J-UCAS Program Office, updated 14 February 2005, available on-line at http://www.darpa.mil/j-
ucas/; Internet; accessed, 20 February 2005. 
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“service-centric” UCAVs for a variety of specific mission areas ranging from 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); suppression of enemy air defenses 
(SEAD), and strike.  Both the Air Force and Navy have very different views of desired 
UCAV mission requirements.  The Air Force envisions a UCAV with a mission emphasis 
on the preemptive destruction and electronic suppression of sophisticated enemy 
integrated air defense systems (IADS) in support of manned strike packages.  The Navy 
envisions a UCAV with a mission emphasis on intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance to complement the targeting of manned assets and long range precision 
strike weapons. 6  The current predicament is borne out of a limited assessment of the 
UCAV technology demonstration phase that has received pressure from Congress to 
mature into a full scale acquisition program.  The current J-UCAS program vision and 
strategy was inherited from a combined congressional and DoD assessment that has 
accounted for the eminent importance of a UCAV that offers low-cost and low-risk while 
the Armed Services have been asked to find a role for its operational employment.  As it 
exists today, the J-UCAS Program Office and DARPA have solicited competing Armed 
Services efforts to build individual “service-centric” UCAVs that satisfy very specific 
mission requirements with little vision or strategy for the development and integration of 
these unmanned combat air vehicles into the Armed Forces and the future battlespace.  
Why must this approach change?  Justification for this change and the importance of 
“getting it right” is perhaps best stated in an assessment by Mr. Michael W. Wynne, 
acting Under Secretary of Defense for Accounting, Technology, and Logistics… 
                                                        
6 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements is Key to 
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program’s Success (GAO-03-598), Washington D.C.: 30 January 2003, 
3-4. 
 6 
"J-UCAS is a key transformational program within the Department of Defense’s 
portfolio.  The capabilities offered by this family of systems can have profound 
implications on the Department’s future warfighting capability and force structure." 
– Mr. Michael W. Wynne, USD(AT&L) (Acting), 23 June 20037 
 
 
Approach to a reassessment and new vision 
The reassessment of a new vision and clear strategy for the J-UCAS acquisition 
program as detailed in this analysis will follow a systems-engineering approach. 8  We 
will initially resolve desired UCAV mission requirements followed by the association of 
performance capabilities and then relate these to the development of critical aviation 
systems.  This approach will present the foundations for a new vision and clear strategy 
for the development and integration of unmanned combat air vehicles into the Armed 
Forces and the future battlespace.  The intent of this paper is not meant to be 
controversial or confrontational, but merely to present a careful reassessment of the J-
UCAS acquisition program as it transitions from its humble beginnings as an assortment 
of technology demonstration aircraft into a “key transformational program” that will most 
certainly “have profound implications on the Department’s future warfighting capability 
and force structure.” 9 
An overview of this approach is presented here in chapter one.  Chapter two will 
acquaint the reader with the background of unmanned combat air vehicle development 
which will refocus on the central question…  Why develop an unmanned air vehicle for 
combat?  Chapter three will provide the historical origins of past procurement trends 
                                                        
7 Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (AT&L) 
(Acting) in an address announcing the decision to establish the J-UCAS Program Office, 23 June 2003. 
8 Defense Acquisition University, Systems Engineering Fundamentals (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense 
Acquisition University Press, January 2001).  See Appendix B and C for additional information. 
9 Ibid. 
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from initial UCAV technology demonstrator programs up to and including the recent 
evolution of the J-UCAS program.  Chapter four will present future procurement trends 
and clearly apply a systems-engineering approach to a reassessment and new vision of 
the J-UCAS acquisition program.  This will be the focus of our effort and will build upon 
the efforts of previous chapters to carefully resolve desired UCAV mission requirements 
followed by the association of performance capabilities and then relate these to the 
development of critical aviation systems in the context of current and emerging 
technologies.  Chapter five will discuss future challenges to the J-UCAS acquisition 
program including policy, programmatic, technological, and operational challenges.  
Finally, chapter six will provide conclusions and recommendations from this 
reassessment and present the DoD and Armed Services with a new vision and clear 
strategy on how to overcome future challenges for the integration of unmanned combat 
air vehicles into the Armed Forces and the future battlespace.
 8 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
 
Why develop an unmanned air vehicle for combat? 
Before we can adequately define the desired mission requirements for the J-
UCAS weapon system we must first answer an essential question…  Why develop an 
unmanned air vehicle for combat?  The answer to this question must assess the potential 
of the J-UCAS weapon system and provide justification for what the J-UCAS offers that 
is not achievable with other weapons systems or more specifically other manned and 
unmanned weapons systems.  In pursuit of these answers, the J-UCAS program should 
focus on maximizing the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages of both manned 
combat aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles.  Furthermore, the J-UCAS must not only 
seek to “bridge the gap” between existing manned and unmanned weapons systems, but 
also account for the potential enhancements to these weapon systems.  It is important to 
note that this is not merely an academic effort, but a necessary endeavor which will lay 
the foundations for the justification of desired mission requirements and performance 
capabilities of the future J-UCAS weapon system. 
It cannot be overstated that UCAV systems should not be used in combat just 
because its possible, but only because they provide a distinct strategic and operational 
advantage.  As previously discussed, the legacy of the current J-UCAS program vision 
and strategy is based upon a cost-risk benefit analysis.  Unfortunately, this low-cost and 
low-risk approach alone will not adequately guide the development of a UCAV with a 
distinct strategic and operational advantage.  To accomplish this effort the J-UCAS 
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program must pursue a strategy to maximize the advantages and minimize the 
disadvantages of both manned combat aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles. 
 
Advantages of the UCAV vs. manned combat aircraft 
The primary strategic and operational advantages that the unmanned combat air 
vehicle offers over manned combat aircraft are the elements of persistence, lethality, and 
survivability.  These advantages are gained by the removal of human restrictions from the 
weapon system.  The advantages of low-cost and low-risk will also be addressed here 
with respect to manned combat aircraft, but it is important to note that in and of 
themselves, they are not considered to provide the UCAV a distinct strategic and 
operational advantage over manned combat aircraft. 
The persistence of unmanned combat air vehicles is their potential to fly for 
extended periods of time which correlates to increased range, endurance, and loiter 
capability.  This increased persistence is partly attributed to the increased fuel capacity 
for a given aircraft size due to the elimination of equipment required to support the 
human interface.  To an even greater degree, this increased persistence is due to a mission 
duration limited only by a machine and not the physiological needs of a human pilot.  
Both the Air Force and Navy currently impose restrictive flight hour limitations on 
aircrew based upon the designated period of flight operations and type of aircraft.  Table 
2-1 depicts Air Force Flight Hour Limitations and Table 2-2 depicts Navy Flight Hour 
Limitations.  These restrictions are based upon the physiological limitations of aircrew.  
It should also be understood that aircrew operating within these limits are still susceptible 
to varying degrees of performance degradation due to the physiological effects of fatigue. 
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Table 2-1 
Air Force Aircrew Flight Hour Limitations 
 
Period (Days) Single Piloted 
Aircraft 
Multi-Piloted 
(Pressurized) 
Ejection Seat 
Aircraft 
Multi-Piloted 
(Non-
Pressurized) 
Aircraft 
Multi-Piloted 
(Pressurized) 
Aircraft 
1 8 12 12 12 
7 30 50 50 50 
30 75 125 125 125 
90 200 200 375 375 
Notes: 
1. For single-seat fighters, if any flying is done at night the maximum flight duty period is 10 hours (12 
hours for dual-seat fighters with two qualified pilots on board). If either sortie is flown at night, fighter 
aircrews will be limited to two sorties per flight duty period; otherwise, they will be limited to three 
sorties per flight duty period. 
2. The maximum flying time for fighter aircrew is 200 hours per calendar quarter. 
Source: “Flying Operations General Flight Rules,” Air Force Instruction 11-202, 15 September 2004. 10 
 
 
 
Table 2-2 
Navy Aircrew Flight Hour Limitations 
 
Period (Days) Single Piloted 
Aircraft 
Multi-Piloted 
(Pressurized) 
Ejection Seat 
Aircraft 
Multi-Piloted 
(Non-
Pressurized) 
Aircraft 
Multi-Piloted 
(Pressurized) 
Aircraft 
1 6.5 12 12 12 
7 30 50 50 50 
30 65 80 100 120 
90 165 200 265 320 
365 595 720 960 1120 
Notes: 
1. Daily flight time should not normally exceed three flights or 6-1/2 total hours flight time for flight 
personnel of single-piloted aircraft.  Individual flight time for flight personnel of other aircraft should 
not normally exceed 12 hours.  The limitations assume an average requirement of 4 hours ground time 
for briefing and debriefing. 
2. Weekly maximum flight time for flight personnel of single-piloted aircraft should not normally exceed 
30 hours.  Total individual flight time for flight personnel of other aircraft should not exceed 50 hours.  
When practicable, flight personnel should not be assigned flight duties on more than 6 consecutive 
days. 
Source: “NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions,” U.S. Navy OPNAVINST 3710.7T, 1 March 
2004. 11 
 
                                                        
10 “Flying Operations General Flight Rules”, U.S. Air Force Instruction 11-202, 15 September 2004, 68-70. 
11 “NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions”, U.S. Navy OPNAVINST 3710.7T, 1 March 2004, 
8-7. 
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Another advantage provided by removing the human element from air combat 
vehicles is the potential for greater lethality and survivability.  These elements are 
attributable to the decreased signature and increased maneuverability that will afford the 
UCAV superior capability to penetrate enemy air defenses and strike enemy targets.   The 
radar cross-section and infrared signature for a UCAV is significantly reduced due to the 
smaller size and the absence of a cockpit and canopy, typically a large area of radar 
reflectivity and a significant contributor to radar signature.   Additionally, the smaller 
vehicle sizes may have even greater survivability implications in the future as new 
detection and tracking technologies mature (e.g., long-wave infrared and vortex-
generation detection, which exploits airflow disturbances caused by aircraft). 12  The 
maneuverability for a UCAV is significantly enhanced due to the ability to pull many 
more G's than could be tolerated by even the most experienced fighter pilot.  The limiting 
factor for UCAV maneuverability now becomes a combination of airframe and engine 
performance.  Table 2-3 depicts Aircrew Rapid Onset Rate G-Tolerance Limitations. 
 
Table 2-3 
Aircrew Rapid Onset Rate G-Tolerance Limitations 
 
Criterion Mean Threshold (G units) 
Standard Deviation 
(G units) Range (G units) 
Grayout or loss of 
peripheral vision 4.1 +0.7 2.2 - 7.1 
Blackout 4.8 +0.8 2.7 - 7.8 
Unconsciousness 5.4 +0.9 3.0 - 8.4 
Source: Louis D. Eldridge, M.D., M.P.H. and Susan E. Northrup, M.D., M.P.H.  “Effects of Acceleration”, 
USAF Flight Surgeons Guide, Chapter 4, 4 June 1999. 13 
                                                        
12 Robert Chapman, II, “Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles, Dawn of a New Age?” Aerospace Power 
Journal (Summer 2002), 3 June 2002, 3-4. 
13 Current research at USAFSAM uses three kinds of centrifuge runs to evaluate G tolerance. The gradual 
onset run (GOR) is conducted at 0.1 G/sec, the rapid onset run (ROR) at 1 G/sec, and very high onset G 
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As previously mentioned, the low-cost and low-risk advantages of UCAV weapon 
systems versus manned combat aircraft are already deeply rooted in the J-UCAS 
acquisition program.  It has been argued that the UCAV offers a long-term advantage in 
cost-savings due to the elimination of aircrew training and the reduction of operations & 
support (O&S) costs as well as the immediate risk-reduction afforded by not exposing 
aircrew to hostile combat environments. 
The government envisions a UCAV with a fly-away unit cost less than one-third 
of the Joint Strike Fighter and a 50-80 percent reduction in the total life cycle costs 
compared to current tactical aircraft squadrons. 14  It is also well documented that 
typically 80 percent of the useful life of today's combat aircraft is devoted to pilot 
training and proficiency flying, requiring longer design lives than would be needed to 
meet combat requirements. 15  Without the requirement to fly sorties to retain pilot 
proficiency, UCAVs will fly less frequently. 
Finally, without the risk of aircrew loss, vehicle attrition becomes less onerous 
from both a moral and a political standpoint.  After all, captured or killed aircrews are 
extremely costly, not only in terms of public relations and morale, but also in terms of 
dollar-replacement value (it costs millions of dollars to train and maintain pilots).   A 
UCAV can be tasked for high-risk, high-payoff missions without attendant risk to human 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(VHOG) at 6 G/sec. The GOR evaluates the body's baroreceptor response to G, as the cardiovascular 
responses have time to be effective. The RORs and VHOGs are more representative of the types of G onset 
profiles that fighter aircrew are likely to experience in current generation of aircraft. This kind of research 
on normal unprotected subjects has resulted in the data found in Table 2-3 based upon 1000 subjects and a 
ROR of 1 G/sec. See Louis D. Eldridge, M.D., M.P.H. and Susan E. Northrup, M.D., M.P.H., “Effects of 
Acceleration,” USAF Flight Surgeons Guide, Chapter 4, 4 June 1999.  Available on-line at 
http://wwwsam.brooks.af.mil/af/files/fsguide/HTML/00_Index.html; Internet; accessed 20 December 2004. 
14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements is Key to 
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program’s Success (GAO-03-598), 3-4. 
15 Ibid. 
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life.  As a result, UCAVs could expand the range of coercive options available to both 
military and political leaders. 
 
Advantages of the UCAV vs. unmanned cruise missiles 
The primary strategic and operational advantage that the unmanned combat air 
vehicle offers over unmanned cruise missiles is in a word flexibility.  This flexibility is 
derived from a weapon system that is both persistent and recoverable.  A persistent 
UCAV has the ability to launch and loiter for extended periods of time before, during, 
and after mission execution.  A recoverable UCAV has the ability to return to the 
intended point of landing to be refueled, rearmed, and reprogrammed for another mission 
as required.  The advantages of low-cost and low-risk will also be addressed here with 
respect to unmanned cruise missiles, but once again it is important to note that in and of 
themselves they are not considered to provide the UCAV a distinct strategic and 
operational advantage over unmanned cruise missiles. 
The increased persistence or loiter capability of the UCAV is derived from the 
increase in fuel capacity and the elimination of human physiological limitations as 
previously discussed.  The persistence of the UCAV would clearly be even further 
enhanced through the potential for an aerial refueling capability (this performance 
capability will be addressed in greater detail).  This persistence directly correlates to an 
extended combat range and endurance not achievable through unmanned cruise missile 
capabilities. 
By common definition the UCAV has the inherent capability to be a recoverable 
and therefore a reusable weapon system.  This is what sets it apart from unmanned cruise 
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missiles and provides not only significant cost-savings potential, but tremendous mission 
flexibility for the Armed Services.  Together, these advantages combine to afford a 
mission flexibility that is the difference between an unmanned cruise missile that is fired 
at a target and a UCAV weapons system that is employed against an enemy. 
Once again, the low-cost advantages of UCAV weapon systems can be applied 
versus unmanned cruise missiles although perhaps not as deeply rooted in the J-UCAS 
acquisition program as the cost-savings advantage over manned combat aircraft.  It can 
been argued that the UCAV offers a long-term advantage in cost-savings due to the cost-
per-target killed. 
Advocates assert that UCAVs employing joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) 
could reduce costs-per-target killed well below that of current standoff systems such as 
cruise missiles.  During Operation Desert Fox, a 70-hour joint military operation ordered 
by the President in December 1998 to destroy military and security targets in Iraq, Navy 
ships fired more than 325 Tomahawk cruise missiles and Air Force B-52s launched more 
than 90 AGM-86C conventional air launched cruise missiles (CALCM). 16  These 
weapons carry warheads weighing 1,000 pounds and 2,000 pounds, respectively. 17  
Alternatively, proponents argue that reusable UCAVs could achieve the same effect at far 
less cost by delivering 1,000-pound and 2,000-pound JDAM guided by the global 
positioning system (GPS).  UCAV proponents argue that the cost-per-target kill contrast 
becomes even greater when one considers procurement, operating, and support costs of 
                                                        
16 DoD news briefing, Gen Henry H. Shelton, 19 December 1998, available on-line at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1998/t12201998_t1219coh.html; Internet; accessed 10 January 2005. 
17 Additional information on DoD standoff weapons is available in Christopher Bolkcom and Bert Cooper’s 
Missiles for Standoff Attack: Air-Launched Air-to-Surface Munitions Programs, CRS Report RL30552 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 9 May 2000). 
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the requisite launch platforms.  Table 2-4 highlights the relative cost comparisons for 
these weapons expenditures.  Of course, the cost implications for future military 
operations will merit further examination once detailed UCAV data becomes available. 
While this cost-savings and apparent risk-reduction are certainly notable 
advantages and clearly contribute to the current justification for building a UCAV, they 
cannot be used to provide the only justification for this effort.  It must be recognized that 
the advantages of low-cost and low-risk can only be realized if the UCAV weapon 
system provides a distinct strategic and operational advantage over existing weapon 
systems.  The advantages of low-cost and low-risk will not justify sacrificing the 
operational capabilities of existing weapon systems.  In other words, a cheap and 
expendable, UCAV does nothing for the Armed Services if it cannot perform combat 
missions as well if not better than existing weapon systems manned or unmanned. 
 
Table 2-4 
Tomahawk/CALCM/JDAM Unit-Cost Comparison 
 
 Tomahawk CALCM JDAM 
Warhead 1,000 lb 2,000 lb 1,000/2,000 lb 
Unit Cost  $569,000 (FY’99 dollars) 
$1,160,000 
(FY’91 dollars) 
$21,000 
(FY’01 dollars) 
Sources: Internet: “Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” United States Navy Fact File, “AGM-86B/C Missiles,” 
USAF Link - Fact Sheet”, “Joint Direct Attack Munitions GBU-31/32,” USAF Link - Fact Sheet”. 18 
                                                        
18 “Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” U.S. Navy Fact File, updated 11 August 2003, available on-line at 
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-toma.html; Internet; accessed 10 January 2005 
and “AGM-86B/C Missiles,” USAF Link - Fact Sheet, updated March 2001, available on-line at 
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=74; Internet; accessed 10 January 2005.  JDAM cost is for 
tail-kit modification to existing Mk 83 and Mk 84 conventional bombs.  See “Joint Direct Attack Munitions 
GBU-31/32,” USAF Link - Fact Sheet, updated June 2003, available on-line at 
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=108; Internet; accessed 10 January 2005. 
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Disadvantages of the UCAV vs. combat aircraft and cruise missiles 
The primary disadvantage that the unmanned combat air vehicle endures versus 
both manned combat aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles is risk.  Specifically, the risk 
of investment in the procurement of a new weapon system that is highly dependent upon 
emerging technologies.  This risk can be further broken down into the challenges of 
optimizing the traditional program measures of cost, schedule, and performance.  There is 
always an inherent risk when it comes to the procurement of new weapon system as 
opposed to the continued support for existing, proven weapon systems.  Every new 
acquisition program is measured based upon its ability to minimize program costs, 
achieve an acceptable schedule timeline, and yield a significant performance advantage 
not only over existing weapon systems, but over the potential for improvements to those 
weapon systems that were negated by the decision to invest in the new technology. 
 
Distinct strategic and operational advantage 
All this leads us back to our original question…  Why develop an unmanned air 
vehicle for combat?  The short answer is to build a weapon system that provides a distinct 
strategic and operational advantage over existing weapon systems.  In summary, the J-
UCAS program should focus on maximizing the advantages and minimizing the 
disadvantages of both manned combat aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles to bridge the 
operational capability gap between these weapon systems.  The J-UCAS program must 
design a weapon system that extends beyond the advantages of low-cost and low-risk and 
seek to achieve the elements of persistence, lethality, survivability, and flexibility.  As 
with any major acquisition program, the J-UCAS program must optimize the traditional 
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program measures of cost, schedule, and performance and actively seek to reduce risk.  
Each of these elements will form the foundations of this J-UCAS program reassessment 
and will be used to derive desired mission requirements, performance capabilities, and 
critical aviation systems for future UCAV weapon systems.
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CHAPTER III 
PAST PROCUREMENT TRENDS – EVOLUTION OF THE J-UCAS 
 
Origins of the J-UCAS program 
The ancestor of today's J-UCAS program was the Uninhabited Tactical Aircraft 
(UTA) program.  This early effort featured low-cost, small air vehicles that would later 
be known as Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs).  Their potential advantage was 
to be inexpensive and therefore if not expendable, then attritable which also meant low-
risk.  In comparison to that earlier time, J-UCAS contractors are currently designing and 
have begun construction of two of the most advanced aircraft ever planned with or 
without a cockpit.  The evolution of the J-UCAS air vehicles illustrates both the wide 
spectrum of capabilities offered by unmanned vehicles and the changing nature of the 
Armed Services' operational and tactical environment. 19 
 
Boeing X-45A and X-45B 
In 1999, DARPA competitively awarded an agreement to Boeing for the 
DARPA/Air Force UCAV program.  The agreement was to build the X-45A, a small 
demonstrator aircraft of only about 12,000 lbs take-off gross weight and only a 29 ft 
wingspan.  The X-45A was designed strictly as a demonstrator, with a minimum life 
expectancy for its airframe.  Even though it would be the first of its kind, the first aircraft 
designed from the ground up as a UCAV and not merely an unmanned air vehicle 
                                                        
19 Ralph Anderson, “Joint Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Systems”, briefing for DARPA Tech 2004. 
Anaheim, CA: 11 March 2004, 
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(UAV), it would in fact be destined to spend most of its life as a software development 
tool for the remainder of its family. 20  Characteristics of the Boeing X-45A are depicted 
in Figure 3-1.  Additional photographs of the X-45A are included in Appendix A. 
Part of the X-45A's unique design was driven by the desire to store the aircraft for 
extended periods in transportable containers.  This concept was aimed at reducing the 
O&S costs for the air vehicles.  All required training would be done via simulation.  The 
containerized UCAV would only be deployed when necessary for high threat conflicts, 
perhaps only twice in a ten or twenty year period.  In such a case, the UCAV would be 
shipped via transport aircraft to the area of the combat operations, where it would then 
deploy at airfields near the scene of action. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 
Boeing X-45A Characteristics 
 
Source: Internet: “J-UCAS Program Overview,” November 2004. 21 
                                                        
20 Ibid, Ralph Anderson. 
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Two X-45A air vehicles were built by Boeing.  Each vehicle has one working 
weapons bay, with an avionics pallet located in the other bay.  The X-45A is all electric, 
except for the nose wheel steering and hiking system.  The engine is fed through a 
serpentine inlet and uses a yaw thrust vectoring system.  The X-45A first took to the air 
on 22 May 2002.  The two X-45As have since demonstrated the basic functionality of 
command and control, communication, and navigation systems, as well as the 
aerodynamic envelope required for future demonstrations.  Both X-45As are still in use 
today at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center.  Along with a T-33 surrogate platform, 
they continue to provide the tools for software development and continue to break new 
barriers in unmanned flight.  This includes the first demonstration of “4-D navigation”, 
the precision control of not just trajectory but timing of the vehicle's movements through 
the tactical environment, a must for integration of the UCAV into the mixed 
manned/unmanned strike packages of the future. 22 
Throughout the early portions of the DARPA/Air Force UCAV program, 
missions were being studied and refined.  The highest priority mission had shifted from 
deep-strike to the SEAD mission through lethal and non-lethal means.  The X-45A's 
planned offspring, the slightly larger X-45B, was on its way to being a relatively short 
range, highly survivable vehicle which could kick the door down for manned strike 
aircraft.  Characteristics of the Boeing X-45B are depicted in Figure 3-2.  Additional 
artist renderings of the X-45B are included in Appendix A. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
21 “Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) Program Overview,” Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) J-UCAS Program Office, updated November 2004, available on-line at 
http://www.darpa.mil/j-ucas/; Internet; accessed 29 December 2004. 
22 Ibid, Ralph Anderson. 
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Figure 3-2 
Boeing X-45B Characteristics 
 
Source: Internet: “J-UCAS Program Overview,” November 2004. 23 
 
 
Northrop Grumman X-47A 
Meanwhile, during these early stages of the DARPA/Air Force UCAV program, a 
second DARPA effort was getting underway.  The DARPA/Naval UCAV-N program had 
two performers in Boeing and Northrop Grumman.  Because of the performance required, 
both companies envisioned a carrier based, catapult launched and arrested landing 
aircraft.  Both contractors had to come came to grips with the difficult challenge of 
designing carrier capability into a UCAV.  First was the realization that storage in a box 
was not appropriate for the carrier environment as this was clearly a “real estate” issue.  
The aircraft carrier is 4-1/2 acres of sovereign US territory that can be moved at will at 
sea.  That small bit of acreage is very costly and anything that goes on it must earn its 
                                                        
23 Ibid, “Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) Program Overview,” updated November 2004. 
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way aboard.  A storage approach would necessarily imply only using the UCAV weapon 
system in a small part of the spectrum of conflict.  An aircraft carrier has missions all 
across that spectrum, from everyday “presence” missions to the first day and first hour of 
a major theater conflict.  To displace existing multi-mission manned aircraft with stored 
“silver bullets” was not an attractive option.  Besides, the Navy's real need was for a 
complement to its already existent manned strike-fighters and their stand-off weapons.  
What the Navy needed was a penetrating, focused surveillance/reconnaissance platform 
that could provide targeting and bomb hit assessment.  In addition, it needed the lethality 
to deal with fleeting high priority targets where appropriate.  Finally it had to be capable 
of safely operating in the carrier environment.  This brought a whole new realm of 
reliability requirements. 24 
As part of Northrop Grumman's Naval UCAV efforts, they produced the X-47A 
Pegasus vehicle.  This was a demonstrator designed to explore for the first time the 
applicability of stealthy, tail-less shapes to the aircraft carrier environment.  The Pegasus 
vehicle flew on 23 February 2003.  A small vehicle of only 5,500 lbs take-off gross 
weight, it demonstrated low-speed handling qualities, air vehicle performance, and 
navigation performance collection.  The X-47A also simulated a tailhook arrestment on a 
carrier flight deck using the shipboard-relative global positioning satellite (SRGPS) 
system as the primary navigation source for precision approach and landing.  This 
successful demonstration simulated touching down with sufficient accuracy near a 
predesignated touchdown point to have caught a wire in a carrier arrested landing. 
                                                        
24 Ibid, Ralph Anderson. 
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Characteristics of the Northrop Grumman X-47A are depicted in Figure 3-3.  Additional 
artist’s renderings of the X-47A are included in Appendix A. 
 
Boeing X-45C 
As these small aircraft were being demonstrated for the first time, the tactical 
environment was changing.  In Operation Enduring Freedom, both the Air Force and the 
Navy experienced very long transit times associated with air combat in a remote region.  
Crews found themselves flying thousands of miles just to get to the combat zone.  In 
addition, the DoD was becoming ever more aware of the hazards of anti-access threats, 
including those enemy capabilities which might prevent the establishment of either land-
based or sea-based tactical units in a threatened region.  One result was evolution of the 
Air Force UCAV design to provide more range and persistence in the battle space. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 
Northrop Grumman X-47A Characteristics 
 
Source: Internet: “J-UCAS Program Overview,” November 2004. 25 
                                                        
25 Ibid, “Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) Program Overview,” updated November 2004. 
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To answer the Air Force need, the Boeing team created the X-45C, based partly 
on its X-46 design that had been developed for the UCAV-N.  The X-45C is designed to 
take affordable stealth to the next level and to provide the most persistent, longest range 
tactical sized aircraft in the modern Air Force inventory.  The aircraft weighs in at 
approximately 36,000 pounds, with a wingspan of nearly 50 ft, and can carry up to 4,500 
pounds of ordnance.  The X-45C design recently passed its Mid-Term Design Review 
and will see its first flight in 2006.  Boeing also proposed a modified version of the X-
45C for Navy use. 26  Characteristics of the Boeing X-45C are depicted in Figure 3-4.  
Additional artist’s renderings of the X-45C are included in Appendix A.  Table 3-1 
details specifications for the Boeing X-45 UCAV series. 
 
Figure 3-4 
Boeing X-45C Characteristics 
 
Source: Internet: “J-UCAS Program Overview,” 14 February 2005. 27 
                                                        
26 Ibid, Ralph Anderson. 
27 Ibid, “Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) Program Overview,” updated 14 February 2005. 
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Table 3-1 
Boeing X-45 Series Specifications 
 
Criterion X-45A X-45B X-45C 
Length 26.5 ft (8.03 m) 36 ft (9.6 m) 39 ft (11.89 m) 
Height 3.7 ft (1.13 m) 4 ft (1.3 m) 6.33 ft (2.03 m) 
Wingspan 33.8 ft (10.31 m) 47 ft (14.3 m) 49 ft (14.93 m) 
Take-off Weight 12,190 lbs (5,530 kg) 
36,500 lbs 
(16,556 kg) 
36,500 lbs 
(16,556 kg) 
Payload Capacity 1,500 lbs (680 kg) 2,000 lbs (890 kg) 4,500 lbs (2,041 kg) 
Propulsion 1x Honeywell F124-GA-100 
1x GE F404-GE-
102D 
1x GE F404-GE-
102D 
Engine Thrust 6,300 lbs (28 kN) 7,000 lbs (31.1 kN) 7,000 lbs (31.1 kN) 
Ceiling 35,000 ft (10,670 m) 45,000 ft (13,720 m) 45,000 ft (13,720 m)
Speed 0.75 Mach 0.85 Mach 0.85 Mach 
Source: Internet: “Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles: Appendix 4: Undesignated Vehicles: 
X-45/X-46”. 28 
 
 
Northrop Grumman/Lockheed Martin X-47B 
The Northrop Grumman/Lockheed Martin team was the first to release its vision 
of a carrier capable UCAV-N to meet the Navy's need.  The “cranked kite” design shows 
its clear ancestry to the X-47A Pegasus, with the addition of winglets to improve low 
speed handling and endurance of the vehicle.  Weighing in at over 42,000 lbs with 4,500 
lbs of weapons payload, it defines the larger end of the current UCAV demonstration 
vehicles.  The X-47B team recently completed its System Requirements Review and will 
also see its first flight in 2006. 29  Characteristics of the Northrop Grumman X-47B are 
depicted in Figure 3-5.  Additional artist’s renderings of the X-47B are included in 
Appendix A.  Table 3-2 details specifications for the Northrop Grumman X-47 series. 
                                                        
28 “Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles: Appendix 4: Undesignated Vehicles: X-45/X-46,” 
updated 4 February 2005, available on-line at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/x-45.html; 
Internet; accessed 15 February 2005. 
29 Ibid, Ralph Anderson. 
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Figure 3-5 
Northrop Grumman X-47B Characteristics 
Source: Internet: “J-UCAS Program Overview,” 14 February 2005. 30 
 
 
 
Table 3-2 
Northrop Grumman X-47 Series Specifications 
 
Criterion X-47A X-47B 
Length 27.9 ft (8.5 m) 38.2 ft (11.6 m) 
Height 5.7 ft (1.73 m) 9.9 ft (3.0 m) 
Wingspan 27.8 ft (8.47 m) 62.1 ft (18.9 m) 
Take-off Weight 5,500 lbs (2,500 kg) 42,000 lbs (19,000 kg) 
Payload Capacity N/A >4,000 lbs 
Propulsion 1x P&W JT15D-5C 1x P&W F100 
Engine Thrust 3,190 lbs (14.2kN) 23,770 lb (105.7 kN) 
Ceiling N/A >40,000 ft (12,200m) 
Speed 0.75 Mach 0.95 Mach 
Source: Internet: “Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles: Appendix 4: Undesignated Vehicles: 
X-47”. 31 
                                                        
30 Ibid, “Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) Program Overview,” updated 14 February 2005. 
31 “Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles: Appendix 4: Undesignated Vehicles: X-47,” updated 8 
February 2005, available on-line at http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/x-47.html; Internet; 
accessed 15 February 2005. 
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Both the X-45C and X-47B are the latest step in the evolution of an affordable 
operational UCAV.  These larger air vehicles will more closely represent the envisioned 
operational systems, to include two full weapons bays and incorporation of low 
observable (LO) technologies.  Although not known at the time, these two vehicles were 
destined to become more closely linked than originally envisioned by their developers. 
The operational and tactical environments were not the only environments that 
were changing.  The political environment was changing as well.  Under pressure from 
Congress to demonstrate an operational capability the DoD grew apprehensive with the 
inefficiency of independent Armed Service demonstration programs.  The Defense 
Department recognized the advantages of consolidating the Armed Service’s efforts on 
the next manned combat aircraft acquisition program also known as the Joint Strike 
Fighter.  DARPA would be the obvious choice to lead a consolidated Air Force and Navy 
effort to develop the first unmanned combat air vehicle.
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CHAPTER IV 
FUTURE PROCUREMENT TRENDS – REASSESSMENT / NEW VISION 
 
Birth of the J-UCAS program 
In October 2003, the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) Program 
Office was formally established under the leadership of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency.  The establishment of the J-UCAS Program Office was directed by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) to 
capitalize on the synergy of individual armed service efforts by combining them into a 
single joint effort. 32  The J-UCAS acquisition program became “a joint DARPA/Air 
Force/Navy effort to demonstrate the technical feasibility, military utility, and operational 
value for a networked system of high performance, weaponized unmanned air vehicles to 
effectively and affordably prosecute 21st century combat missions, including Suppression 
of Enemy Air Defenses, surveillance, and precision strike within the emerging global 
command and control architecture.” 33 
The J-UCAS Program Office, was directed to coordinate planning and execution 
of a demonstration program that supports both Air Force and Navy emerging 
requirements.  The development and evolution of requirements is a critical part of the J-
UCAS program.  This demonstration program will culminate in a robust operational 
assessment beginning in fiscal year 2007 that is expected to provide the services with 
several “program options” by fiscal year 2009.  Officials from the Air Force, Navy, Joint 
                                                        
32 Amy Butler, “DARPA Will Lead Joint UCAV Office,” Inside Defense, Inside Washington Publishers, 
Washington D.C.: June 24, 2003, 8-9. 
33 Ibid, “Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) Program Overview,” updated November 2004. 
 29 
Staff, Joint Forces Command and the Pentagon's program analysis and evaluation office 
will comprise an executive committee that will work with the DARPA director.  This 
Joint Services Requirements Group will exclusively develop and assess J-UCAS 
requirements.  The group will be accountable to the Armed Services, but will also 
provide input directly to the J-UCAS Director.  The DARPA director will report to the 
office of the USD (AT&L), effectively bypassing the service bureaucracies. 34 
The J-UCAS program combines the efforts that were previously conducted under 
the DARPA/Air Force Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) program and the 
DARPA/Navy Naval UCAV-N program.  The Air Force and Navy have very different 
missions planned for the UCAV.  The Air Force is focused on the SEAD mission, as well 
as an electronic attack role.  In this role, the J-UCAS would serve as a “first day of the 
war” force enabler that will complement a strike package by performing the SEAD 
mission, via lethal and non-lethal means.  The J-UCAS would accomplish preemptive 
destruction and electronic suppression of sophisticated enemy IADS in support of 
manned strike packages.  The Navy is focused on a long-dwell air surveillance aircraft 
that could also perform strike missions.  In this role, the J-UCAS would provide carrier-
based, survivable, and persistent ISR to complement the targeting of manned assets and 
long range precision strike weapons. 35  The two UCAVs would also be employed 
differently, with the Air Force keeping their vehicle in storage until needed, while the 
Navy plans on more frequent usage for its UCAV.  Although these initial efforts were 
specifically targeted towards their service-specific needs, the Defense Department 
                                                        
34 Ibid, Amy Butler. 
35 Ibid, “Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) Program Overview,” updated November 2004. 
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recognized the potential for “significant synergy” by combining the programs to support 
both Air Force and Navy requirements. 
 
The current J-UCAS vision 
The current J-UCAS vision as it exists today is to develop a weapon system that 
expands tactical mission options and provides revolutionary new air power and 
penetrating surveillance capability.  The J-UCAS weapon system will exploit the design 
and operational flexibility of an uninhabited vehicle to enable a new paradigm in 
warfighting while maintaining the judgment and moral imperative of the human operator.  
The J-UCAS is designed for minimal maintenance to reduce cost.  It will be capable of 
dynamic mission planning with varying levels of autonomy.  The J-UCAS has the 
potential to fully exploit the emerging information revolution and provide advanced 
airpower with increased tactical deterrence at a fraction of the total life cycle costs of 
current manned systems. 36 
The J-UCAS weapon system will enable a new affordability paradigm by 
reducing both acquisition and O&S costs.  Removing the pilot from the vehicle 
eliminates man-rating requirements, pilot systems, and interfaces.  New design 
philosophies can be used to optimize the design for aerodynamics, signature, reduced 
maintenance, and low-cost manufacturing processes.  Advances in small smart munitions 
will allow these smaller vehicles to attack multiple targets during a single mission and 
reduce the cost-per-target killed, while minimizing the prospects for geo-location errors 
and fratricide.  Improvements in sensor technologies also allow significant advances in 
                                                        
36 Ibid, “Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) Program Overview,” updated November 2004. 
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surveillance and reconnaissance over high threat areas.  The J-UCAS will be highly 
effective with a significant reduction in life-cycle costs over current systems. 37 
 
The current J-UCAS strategy 
The J-UCAS Program Office has taken the first steps to capitalize on individual 
armed service efforts by combining them into a single joint effort.  The J-UCAS Program 
Office has implemented a strategy to ensure cooperation founded upon the principles of a 
Common Operating System (COS) to facilitate the integration of subsystems such as 
communications, sensors, and weapons while minimizing the impact from platform 
constraints.  In addition, the COS will establish a system architecture that ensures intra-
operability between the internal components of J-UCAS and inter-operability with 
external elements such as manned aircraft, command and control centers, and space 
assets.  For initial demonstrations, a single suite of sensors accompanied by common 
mission avionics and software applications will be developed.  The COS approach will 
lead to the reduction of costs, the lowering of barriers to the entry of new technology, and 
the acceleration of a network-centric warfighting capability. 38 
The J-UCAS program is still in the early stages of the formal DoD acquisition 
process, represented in Figure B-1.  As part of this process, the J-UCAS program is being 
conducted in multiple overlapping spirals of increasing capability toward the objective 
system as depicted in Figure 4-1.  Spiral 0 consists of two X-45A and one X-47A 
demonstrator aircraft and their associated simulation, mission control, and support 
                                                        
37 Ibid. 
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Figure 4-1 
J-UCAS Acquisition Program Spiral 
 
Source: Briefing, subject: “J-UCAS Program Overview,” November 2004. 39 
 
 
systems.  Spiral 0 for the X-45A also includes four increasingly capable software blocks, 
demonstrated through flight.  Spiral 1 includes improved air vehicle designs, the low 
observable X-45C and X-47B demonstrators, allowing for significant payload, range, and 
persistence as well as improved simulation, mission control, and support systems.  Future 
spirals will provide greater operational utility and demonstration opportunities. 40 
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Reassessment of the J-UCAS vision and strategy 
Why the need for a reassessment and new vision?  The above vision and strategy 
is direct from the J-UCAS Program Office.  This language clearly reflects an emphasis on 
low-cost and low-risk built upon a foundation of commonality and the intra- and inter-
operability of systems architecture.  What it fails to specify with any clear language are 
desired J-UCAS mission requirements.  Furthermore, it also fails to assign any specificity 
to J-UCAS performance capabilities that will make possible desired mission requirements 
and guide the development of critical aviation systems.  This approach will not guarantee 
a UCAV that provides the Armed Services with a distinct strategic and operational 
advantage.  The focus of this chapter will be on a reassessment of the J-UCAS desired 
mission requirements to include the identification of performance capabilities that will 
further serve to guide the development of critical aviation systems in the context of 
current and emerging technologies.  This chapter will apply a systems engineering 
approach where the identification of desired mission requirements, performance 
capabilities, and critical aviation systems correlate to the “requirements analysis”, 
“functional analysis and allocation”, and “design synthesis” elements of the Systems 
Engineering Process as detailed in Appendix C.  This reassessment will continue to 
incorporate the current J-UCAS COS approach. 
 
Desired mission requirements 
The J-UCAS must be designed through joint cooperation from all the Armed 
Services with an emphasis on flexible, multi-mission capability to include intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; suppression of enemy air defenses and strike.  The J-
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UCAS weapon system must be built from the outset with the inherent capability to 
perform all these missions and the flexibility to perform those missions that have not yet 
been identified.  J-UCAS systems should not be developed just because they promise to 
perform some missions less expensively and with less risk than manned aircraft, nor 
should they be designed specifically to support “service-centric” mission requirements.  
The Armed Services are poorly served by the development of individual “service-centric” 
UCAVs for specific mission areas. 
The J-UCAS program must be designed to provide a distinct strategic and 
operational advantage over manned combat aircraft and unmanned cruise missile 
capabilities.  It is imperative that the J-UCAS Program Office extend its reach beyond an 
approach that incorporates these mission requirements, to the pursuit of a design 
philosophy that strives to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of 
both manned combat aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles.  This design philosophy 
must incorporate the elements of persistence, lethality, survivability, and flexibility into 
identified performance capabilities and the design goals for critical aviation systems. 
 
Performance capabilities 
The J-UCAS Program Office should establish well defined performance 
capabilities in the categories of command and control, joint interoperability, and mission 
flexibility.  These categories are believed to provide the functional areas to incorporate 
the elements of persistence, lethality, survivability, and flexibility into key performance 
capabilities.  The J-UCAS weapon systems should be capable of man-in-the-loop (MITL) 
and autonomous command and control.  The J-UCAS weapon systems should be 
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designed to operate in a joint environment in coordination with manned aircraft within 
the emerging global command and control architecture.  Finally, the J-UCAS weapon 
systems should be designed with flexible, multi-mission capability to include 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; suppression of enemy air defenses and 
strike from the outset with the inherent capability to perform all these missions and the 
flexibility to perform those missions that have not yet been identified.  These 
performance capabilities will prove to be the motivation for a common operating system 
that serves to guide the future integration of critical aviation systems. 
 
Command and Control 
The J-UCAS weapon systems should be capable of MITL and autonomous 
command and control.  The degree of autonomy versus MITL control necessary will be 
dictated by actual mission requirements and the J-UCAS must be flexible enough to 
transition between these two levels during the course of the mission as required.  For 
example, the execution of a pre-planned flight route would allow for a higher degree of 
autonomous control than actual weapons employment which will require a direct MITL 
interface to ensure all requirements are satisfied before the application of lethal force.  
Additionally, the capability to immediately transfer from MITL to autonomous control 
would be necessary to afford the J-UCAS the freedom of action to execute pre-planned 
defensive maneuvers for self-protection in the event an imminent threat is detected.  It 
can be seen that the optimum level of autonomy must be assessed based upon the type of 
mission, the operational circumstances, and the degree of operational employment 
experience. 
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The J-UCAS should have the capability to transmit and receive as well as relay 
command, control, and communications (C3) between other UCAVs and mobile units 
located hundreds of miles from the battlefield.  These mobile land-based or sea-based 
mission control stations (MCS) shall serve as the primary interface for J-UCAS 
integration into the emerging global command and control architecture of command, 
control, communications, computers, and intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance 
(C4ISR).  The MCS should provide the air vehicle mission planning and control, a 
human-system interface, all ground communications, and the infrastructure required to 
conduct all J-UCAS operations.  The MCS shall be transportable and modular to the 
extent that all or portions of the MCS can be land, sea, or air-based. 
The MCS should be capable of planning and updating routes and missions that the 
J-UCAS could perform autonomously as dictated by the mission or in the event of a 
temporary or permanent C3 failure.  Because of its critical nature, the C3 systems 
architecture would necessarily be via redundant, secure satellite relay and line-of-sight 
(LOS) communication links.  The MCS should be capable of providing the full range of 
operational and tactical command and control ranging from administrative navigational 
directions to more critical weapons employment decisions.  While the MCS should 
always retain operational command and control, the J-UCAS should also incorporate a 
capability to receive tactical control from designated land-based, sea-based or airborne 
platforms with greater situational awareness of the battlefield environment.  These 
tactical control operators would be capable of providing real-time mission essential 
inputs directly related to critical weapons employment decisions.  The J-UCAS should be 
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capable of providing feedback and sensor situational awareness of the battlefield 
environment, allowing the tactical operator to make the appropriate tactical decisions. 
As operational airspace users, the J-UCAS must be responsive to a continuously 
changing airspace management picture and must not restrict other users in the 
battlespace.  The J-UCAS should be capable of rapid mission changes, from mission 
abort orders to the redirection to more urgent targets.  In order to achieve this capability, 
the J-UCAS needs to incorporate links to the global network to accept mission changes 
from the central air operations center (CAOC) or its controlling agency and not solely 
from system-discrete protocols.  The MCS should allow each operator to direct the 
activities of four or more individual J-UCAS vehicles to plan routes and missions that 
they can perform with varying levels of autonomy.  This should be developed to the point 
that multiple air vehicles will be operated in coordinated strike missions. 
 
Joint Interoperability 
The J-UCAS weapon systems should be designed to operate in a joint 
environment in coordination with manned aircraft within the emerging global command 
and control architecture.  The J-UCAS must be designed without impediments to crossing 
the lines of air, land, and maritime combat operations in order to effectively operate in a 
joint environment.  The J-UCAS must be able to interface with manned platforms and 
operators between the Armed Services and be capable of transferring command and 
control between operators in order to effectively function in a joint environment.  This 
transfer of command and control will enable the J-UCAS the capability to interface with 
multiple manned platforms/operators at various stages of its mission.  This is the only 
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way to achieve joint coordination with the Armed Forces and ensure the J-UCAS 
operational effectiveness throughout the entire battlespace. 
The J-UCAS must be capable of integrating with the CAOC controlling the full 
array of unmanned systems within a single architecture.  All resources should be 
coordinated through the CAOC and integrated into the joint air tasking order (ATO), 
even if different members of a joint or multi-national task force deploy several different 
UCAV and UAV systems.  Mission planning and control should be a continuous and 
seamless function that begins with mission planning and assignment via the ATO and 
continues through mission execution with mission monitoring, control, and re-planning 
coordinated through the CAOC.  The MCS should automatically load and translate ATO 
information into the mission planning system.  Mission planning and execution functions 
shall be flexible and adaptable to react to the dynamics of operations, conflict level, and 
communications capacity. 
A major factor motivating the development of the COS is the level of integration 
and interoperability implied by the J-UCAS concept.   J-UCAS is much more than a 
single ground station and a single platform, but rather a collection of platforms and 
multiple control elements all linked together with the infrastructure and support systems 
to provide a single, seamless integrated capability.  The system should be versatile in 
performing its various mission functions.  The J-UCAS elements therefore, have to be 
intra-operable as well as inter-operable with external elements of the system. 
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Mission Flexibility 
The J-UCAS weapon systems should be designed through joint cooperation from 
all the Armed Services with flexible, multi-mission capability.  This includes intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; suppression of enemy air defenses; and strike.  In 
addition, the J-UCAS weapon system must also provide the inherent capability to 
perform all these missions and the flexibility to perform those missions that have not yet 
been identified.  The Armed Services are poorly served by the development of individual 
“service-centric” UCAVs for specific mission areas.  Joint cooperation between the Air 
Force and Navy with inputs from the other Armed Services must be involved in the J-
UCAS procurement process from the very beginning to guide the pursuit of this flexible, 
multi-mission capability. 
It is envisioned that the J-UCAS will be operated in large coordinated strike 
package missions with other UCAVs and manned aircraft.  The J-UCAS should be 
capable of fulfilling various coordinated mission requirements within the strike package.  
In the ISR role the J-UCAS could provide real-time target location information or 
feedback of post-strike battle damage assessment.  In the SEAD role, the J-UCAS should 
provide electronic attack jamming of enemy search and track radar sites or employ pre-
planned or reactive weapons against enemy air defense sites.  In the strike role, the J-
UCAS should deliver multiple, advanced precision-guided munitions to strike enemy 
targets and relay confirmed battlefield damage back to mission control. 
While the performance capabilities for the missions of ISR, SEAD, and strike are 
unique, the strike mission is arguably the most complex.  The diversity of today’s strike 
missions range from pre-planned strike, air-interdiction strike, strike coordination and 
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armed reconnaissance, time-sensitive and time-critical strike to close air support.  The 
key ingredient to performing each of these strike missions is flexibility.  The required 
degree of flexibility can only be afforded by a J-UCAS that is capable of integrating with 
both manned ground stations and airborne combat aircraft. 
In order to achieve true mission flexibility, the J-UCAS should be designed with 
the intent to conduct the most complex of strike missions namely, close air support 
(CAS) and time-critical strike (TCS) missions. 41  Many have argued that these missions 
are far too complex and dynamic, well beyond the capabilities of a UCAV platform.  
Both the CAS and TCS missions highlight the importance of joint interoperability and 
mission flexibility in order to successfully coordinate between the Armed Services and 
interface with both ground and airborne platforms.  This includes the ability to 
accomplish the following mission essential tasks: 
a. Interface with a ground or airborne controllers to include receiving instructions in 
real-time to loiter and execute ordnance delivery on designated target locations 
within prescribed parameters (airspeed, heading, altitude, and time). 
b. Deliver JDAM munitions on GPS coordinates or laser guided bomb (LGB) 
munitions on a laser designated target by an off-board ground or airborne sensor. 
c. Remain airborne for extended periods of time in order to be on-call, around the 
clock to prosecute fleeting mission requirements. 
 
To achieve this level of mission flexibility one cannot ignore the requirement for 
extended combat range/endurance.  The J-UCAS will require an aerial refueling 
capability to enable it to remain airborne for mission tasking for extended periods of 
time.  As previously identified, the J-UCAS combat range/endurance will not be limited 
by human fatigue in the case of manned aircraft, nor will it be limited by internal fuel in 
                                                        
41 The time critical strike (TCS) mission is a highly specialized strike mission performed by combat aircraft 
to immediately prosecute tactical, operational, and strategic targets in a compressed vulnerability window. 
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the case of cruise missiles.  The importance of this aerial refueling capability cannot be 
over emphasized.  It should be considered every bit as much of a required performance 
capability as weapons employment itself. 
 
Summary of Performance Capabilities 
It has been shown how the performance capability categories of command and 
control, joint interoperability, and mission flexibility each apply the elements of 
persistence, lethality, survivability, and flexibility.  Command and control ensures the 
ability to transfer manpower commitments between operators (persistence); to transfer 
tactical control to operators with the greatest situational awareness (lethality); to afford 
the appropriate degree of autonomy for self-protection when threatened (survivability); 
and to transfer command and control based on actual mission requirements, operational 
circumstances, and level of experience (flexibility).  Joint interoperability ensures the 
ability to cross the lines of air, land, and maritime combat operations (persistence); and 
the ability to execute cooperative engagement of a wide variety of hostile threats and 
targets with other combat weapon systems of the Armed Services (lethality, survivability, 
and flexibility).  Finally, mission flexibility ensures the ability to extend range, 
endurance, and loiter with aerial refueling (persistence); the ability to perform a variety of 
different missions (lethality and survivability); and the ability to combine extended 
range/endurance and multi-mission capability to ensure the J-UCAS will be available for 
the most demanding missions when called upon (flexibility). 
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Critical aviation systems 
The J-UCAS Program Office should identify critical aviation systems in order to 
ensure that previously identified performance capabilities satisfy mission requirements.  
These critical aviation systems include flight control, navigation, communication, 
resource management, contingency management, and battle management.  Each of these 
critical aviation systems should be incorporated as part of the COS to form the backbone 
of the performance capabilities of command and control, joint interoperability, and 
mission flexibility.  The intent is not to specify design requirements or to direct the 
implementation of specific technologies, but simply to provide insight into the 
performance capability requirements of the critical aviation systems themselves. 
The J-UCAS will employ the COS architecture to integrate the system 
components and provide the necessary software and services to enable system 
functionality, while minimizing the impact of platform constraints.  The COS architecture 
is designed to ensure intra-operability between the internal J-UCAS system elements and 
inter-operability with other external systems such as manned aircraft, command and 
control stations, and other relevant assets be they airborne, space-based or ground-based.  
The COS approach should be able to incorporate a number of other configurations that 
might be required to pursue additional missions as the J-UCAS moves into the future and 
its mission requirements and performance capabilities change. 
 
Flight Control System 
The J-UCAS flight control system should provide stability and control functions 
to perform the actual remote and autonomous ground and flight operations of the air 
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vehicle.  This system should be highly automated in order to continuously implement 
navigation, collision avoidance, terrain avoidance, and attack maneuvering.  The J-UCAS 
flight control system must incorporate an advanced computerized digital flight control 
system technology with a high level of redundancy to manage system failures and 
provide for fail-safe and degraded operational capability. 
A number of design factors suggest the need for advanced computerized digital 
flight control technology.  Initial J-UCAS demonstrator aircraft incorporate a “tail-less” 
or “flying-wing” design to capitalize on the reduced size, weight, and radar signature of 
this configuration.  This unique configuration is inherently less stable than conventional 
aircraft designs due to the lack of traditional vertical and horizontal tail stabilizers and 
control effectors.  Furthermore, the stability and control of a J-UCAS of reduced size and 
weight compared to conventional manned aircraft may be further complicated by the 
increased effects of changes in the center of gravity due to the expenditure of both fuel 
and conventional 1,000-pound class munitions.  Due to the absence of vertical control 
surfaces, thrust vectoring and/or differential movements of control surfaces must be 
incorporated to provide longitudinal, lateral, and directional stability and control.  The 
Boeing X-45 flight control system incorporates elevons for roll and pitch control and 
vectored thrust to provide directional control.  The Northrop Grumman X-47 flight 
control system incorporates a pair of one-piece elevons and two sets of upper- and lower-
surface “inlay” flaps.  The elevons are used for pitch and roll control and the inlay flaps 
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work like the split rudders on the B-2, providing yaw control and added drag to 
decelerate and increase descent angles. 42 
The J-UCAS flight control system requires lightweight control actuators that 
incorporate emerging technologies currently under development to meet the performance 
and cost challenges of unmanned combat aerial vehicles.  This flight control actuation 
system includes a family of adaptable, configurable electro-mechanical actuators (EMA), 
power drive, and control electronics and software.  Low-cost, high-power primary, 
secondary, and utility EMAs provide the advanced technology solutions required to 
support this revolutionary new weapon system. 43 
The J-UCAS automatic flight control system will have to adapt to a broader range 
of fight profiles, including supersonic speed and evasive maneuvers to the limits of the 
aircraft.  The J-UCAS must capitalize on automated flight control system technology 
from previous tailless aircraft such as the NASA X-36 Tailless Research Aircraft.  This 
aircraft demonstrated the application of digital fly-by-wire flight control systems to 
successfully perform aggressive maneuvers with an unstable aircraft.  This flight control 
system must also be redundant and flexible enough to adapt to degraded operations in the 
event of mechanical failure and/or combat damage. 44 
 
                                                        
42 Ibid, “Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles: Appendix 4: Undesignated Vehicles: X-45/X-46” 
and “Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles: Appendix 4: Undesignated Vehicles: X-47.” 
43 “Electromechanical Activation (EMA) for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles,” Parker Aerospace, 
available on-line at http://www.parker.com/ead/cm2.asp?cmid=585&; Internet; accessed 1 January 2005.  
“Actuators for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles,” HR Textron, available on-line at http://www.airforce-
technology.com/contractors/flight/hr_textron/; Internet; accessed 1 January 2005. 
44 “X-36 Fighter Agility Research Aircraft,” NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, updated 2 January 
2001, available on-line at http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/gallery/photo/X-36/; Internet; accessed 1 January 2005. 
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Navigation System 
The J-UCAS navigation system should provide the guidance and routing 
functions to perform the remote and autonomous ground and flight tracking of the air 
vehicle.  The navigation system should be fully programmable to provide accurate 
navigation throughout the mission and be capable of dynamically responding to re-
programmable updates in heading, speed, and altitude during all phases of the mission 
profile.  This system should be compliant with the Global Air Navigation System 
(GANS).  The J-UCAS navigation system should incorporate a blended inertial 
navigation system and global positioning system with a high level of redundancy to 
manage system failures and provide for degraded operational capability. 
The J-UCAS and MCS should have the capability to autonomously calculate an 
optimal flight plan based upon an operator approved constraint set and provide the 
flexibility to update the current flight plan in real-time.  The J-UCAS and MCS should 
continuously monitor available fuel and fuel consumption rates to predict fuel 
requirements.  To the maximum extent possible the J-UCAS should optimize its flight 
profile to facilitate maximum range/endurance operations.  Even though the J-UCAS will 
be capable of operating in adverse weather conditions, it is desired that the aircraft have 
the capability to avoid areas of heavy precipitation and thunderstorms. 
Current state-of-the-art navigation systems provide phenomenal performance 
capabilities by combining the global positioning system (GPS) with inertial navigation 
systems (INS) comprised of fiber-optic gyros.  Modern INS/GPS modules weigh less 
than 20 lbs and provide positional accuracies of at least 16m CEP and velocity accuracies 
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to within 0.03m/s RMS. 45  Since GPS systems may be jammed by enemy defenses, these 
systems should function independently despite intermittent losses of GPS signals. 46  
Other methods of updating navigational fixes to include cross-referencing on-board and 
off-board sensors should be incorporated. 
Additional advances in terrain-referenced navigation (TRN) offers further 
refinements to navigation systems.  A digital terrain elevation database exists containing 
100m resolution (Level 1) for all land areas.  Onboard TRN systems can be loaded with 
these data to provide positional accuracy of 30m CEP and velocity to within 4m/s RMS 
(requires flight altitude below 1500m using a radar altimeter at least 75% of the time).  
By extrapolating the vehicle’s vector, this system renders optimal “nap-of-the-earth” 
flight paths that can be followed autonomously. 47 
The navigation system must also incorporate a precision approach and landing 
system compatible for both land-based and sea-based recovery.  The Armed Services are 
currently incorporating a Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) that is 
based on INS/GPS system capabilities.  The Air Force is currently fielding this system in 
operational aircraft.  The Navy is currently testing a sea-based version known as the 
Shipboard Relative GPS (SRGPS) precision approach landing system that incorporates 
relative ship motion into JPALS approach and recovery signals. 48 
                                                        
45 CEP or Circular Error Probable indicates a 50% probability of any error falling within a circle of the 
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the “degree of error” of a varying quantity. 
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47 Ibid. 
48 Jack Waters, Paul Sousa, Lee Wellons, Glenn Colby, and John Weir, "Test Results of an F/A-18 
Automatic Carrier Landing Using Shipboard Relative GPS," briefing for 57th Annual Meeting of The 
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Communication System 
The J-UCAS communication system should provide internal and external 
communications to facilitate the network-centric quality of service for the COS 
architecture.  The communication system should incorporate beyond line-of-sight, line-
of-sight, and internal network communications.  The COS must be designed to provide 
robust and secure critical interfaces to the global command and control network 
architecture and should be designed to provide the required level of redundancy to 
manage system failures and provide degraded operational capability. 
One of the great prospects for J-UCAS operations is the ability to form a 
distributed network in the sky that coordinates sensors and weapons in real-time.  Robust, 
jam-proof communication becomes a critical issue in this endeavor.  While the J-UCAS 
will function autonomously, it is likely that some amount of operator input and 
supervision will always be required.  At a minimum, the J-UCAS will have to receive 
data on flight path and waypoints, target and threat, locations and type.  Weapons release 
will require confirmation by a human operator, and the J-UCAS will have to carry a 
reliable self-destruct mechanism not only to prevent collateral damage should they go out 
of control, but also to safeguard onboard sensitive technology and theater data.  They will 
also have to receive and respond to queries for location and status.  The J-UCAS must 
also broadcast intelligence on pop-up targets as they are encountered. 
Maximum use should be made of existing communications hardware and software 
consistent with an integrated system and joint interoperability requirements.  The COS 
                                                                                                                                                                     
which provides precision navigation and two-way Air Traffic Control (ATC) for sea-based aircraft 
operations, as well as the local differential systems for providing precision landing capability ashore.  The 
SRGPS supports all ATC functions including takeoff, departure, taxi, marshal (holding), approach, landing, 
bolter, missed approach, and long-range navigation. 
 48 
must integrate the wide range of communication technologies including beyond line-of-
site satellite communications (SATCOM) and tactical common data link systems, line-of-
site link-16 joint tactical information and multifunctional information distribution 
systems, and even remote computer network systems. 49  Commercial and military 
satellite constellations can be used for theater-wide connectivity.  These satellite 
constellations should serve as the primary C² communications network for UCAV 
platforms.  The Military Strategic, Tactical, & Relay (MILSTAR) SATCOM narrow-
beam antennas coupled with broad-band frequency hopping provide isolation from 
jammers and a very low probability of detection. 50 
J-UCAS communications requirements are likely to require substantial 
communications bandwidth.  As a result it is desired to minimize bandwidth requirements 
consistent with mission effectiveness.  Narrowband communications should enable the 
minimum level of functionality required to sustain mission operations.  These 
communications should be two-way with enough connectivity in each direction to assure 
safety of flight and mission accomplishment.  Wideband line-of-sight and beyond line-of-
sight communications should be geared to enable full mission functionality. 
If a J-UCAS were to lose communication contact, it would have to either loiter or 
turn for home until a signal is reacquired.  However, the number of communications 
paths available in a particular theater should provide the J-UCAS with ample recourse 
even in hostile environments.  In addition to broadband communication satellites, aircraft, 
and ground stations there are other all-weather, line-of-sight communications that are 
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practically unjammable even over great distances.  For example, a communications 
aircraft at an altitude of 15km can maintain a line-of-sight with another aircraft, flying at 
altitudes of just one km, up to a range of 400km.  On the other hand, communications at 
certain radio frequencies are readily absorbed by the atmosphere, permitting covert and 
practically unjammable communications between a J-UCAS and a local airborne MCS. 51 
Broad-band frequency hopping and microburst communication substantially 
reduce susceptibility to jamming.  In broad-band frequency hopping, as the frequency 
band is expanded, the jammer must consume proportionally more power to limit the 
capacity of communications.  In microburst communications, the jammers cannot 
determine what channels are in use to begin jamming before a message has been sent.  In 
these cases, technology tends to favor the broadcaster rather than the jammer.  
Furthermore, homing anti-radiation missiles (HARM) that are capable of targeting 
jamming radiation sources are widely deployed.  The known presence of these weapons 
in a theater can discourage high-power jammers from operating even momentarily, since 
modern HARMs can stay locked on targets even after they stop radiating.  All of these 
technologies can contribute to providing a robust and secure communications network. 
The J-UCAS computer architecture shall comply with the Joint Technical 
Architecture (JTA). 52  The MCS should have modular interfaces with the emerging 
C4ISR infrastructure to exploit archived and real-time data sources.  The MCS shall have 
an interface with the CAOC via the command and control network for air tasking orders, 
real-time mission updates, and target folders.  The J-UCAS should provide connectivity 
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with the CAOC via the C4ISR network with real-time situation awareness, tasking, 
targeting and threat identification.  In addition, the J-UCAS and MCS should be capable 
of real-time reporting with the CAOC via intelligence networks.  This capability should 
leverage the existing infrastructure to the maximum extent possible. 
 
Resource Management System 
The J-UCAS resource management system should provide for the management 
functions of consumables (fuel, oil, and coolant), sensors, and weapons.  This system 
should also be highly automated in order to sustain consumable requirements, synthesize 
on-board and off-board sensor capabilities and interface with on-board weapons 
management.  The J-UCAS resource management system is critical to ensuring persistent 
combat operations and should be designed to provide the required level of redundancy to 
manage system failures and provide degraded operational capability. 
The J-UCAS must sustain extended combat range/endurance which requires 
dedicated management of consumable resources.  As a result of high consumption rates 
and limited storage capacity, fuel becomes a critical resource compared to oil and 
coolant.  The J-UCAS consumables management system must support aerial refueling.  
The issue is how to design a J-UCAS aerial refueling system since the Air Force and 
Navy operate two distinctly different configurations and concepts of operation.  The Air 
Force incorporates refueling tankers with a “boom and receiver” configuration that 
allows the tanker to manually connect to the receiving aircraft.  The receiving aircraft 
establishes a steady position relative to the tanker while the boom operator on the tanking 
aircraft manually connects the refueling boom to the receiving aircraft.  The Navy 
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incorporates refueling tankers with a “probe and drogue” configuration that requires the 
receiving aircraft to connect to the tanker.  The receiving aircraft must manually connect 
to the tanker’s flexible hose and refueling drogue.  Since the Navy configuration requires 
extremely precise corrections on the part of the receiving aircraft to connect to a moving 
drogue it poses seemingly insurmountable challenges to designing a UCAV with the 
same capability.  This leaves the Air Force configuration as the “design-of-choice” for 
the future integration of unmanned air combat vehicles. 53 
It should be noted that this decision will have major implications for the Navy and 
this issue needs to be resolved early in the design process.  Not only does the Navy not 
currently operate refueling tankers with a “boom and receiver” configuration, but all 
Navy aircraft are designed to only receive fuel from a “probe and drogue” configured 
tanker.  The two configurations are not interoperable.  In fact, Air Force tankers require 
ground modification to accomplish aerial refueling with Navy aircraft.  The introduction 
of a UCAV with an aerial refueling “boom and receiver” configuration will have major 
implications for carrier operations.  This example serves to highlight the need for 
cooperation between the Armed Services to ensure joint interoperability issues in the 
respective service environments are resolved as soon as possible to facilitate the 
development of critical aviation systems without jeopardizing performance capabilities. 54 
The resource management system must provide for the synthesis of on-board and 
off-board sensor capabilities.  It is desired to make maximum use of on-board and off-
board intelligent decision aids to minimize mission control team workload and enable 
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graceful degradation of system functionality during emergency operations.  At a 
minimum, the COS should have the embedded intelligence to autonomously respond to 
dynamic real-time events such as loss of data link and other critical emergencies. 
The resource management system must also provide for weapons management to 
include power on/off, prepping, programming, arming, and on-board diagnostics.  
Maximum flexibility for internal and/or external weapons carriage should be considered 
in order to facilitate the maximum integration of current and future weapons. The 
structural integrity of the airframe and suspension equipment should permit carriage and 
delivery of a wide range of weapons as well internal fuel tanks, practice munitions, and 
defensive countermeasures.  Safe carriage, release, separation, and weapons effects 
should be a principal concern when investigating payload options. The J-UCAS should 
also be designed for the safe recovery of unexpended ordnance. 
 
Contingency Management System 
The J-UCAS contingency management system should provide for the 
management functions of prognostic and health information related to the operational 
status of the air vehicle and all its components.  It should manage information with a 
“publish-and-subscribe” system and perform the necessary data fusion and corrective 
action assignments. 55  The J-UCAS contingency management system should be highly 
automated and designed to provide the required level of redundancy to manage system 
                                                        
55 In a “publish-and-subscribe” system, messages are reported with a functional area ("publish"), rather than 
being addressed to specific recipients.  The reporting system then sends the message to all eligible systems 
on the COS network ("subscribe").  This form of asynchronous messaging is a far more scalable 
architecture than point-to-point alternatives such as message queuing, since message senders need only 
concern themselves with creating the original message, and can leave the task of data fusion and servicing 
to the messaging infrastructure. 
 53 
failures.  It should provide degraded operational capability that incorporates graceful 
degradation to include fail-operational and fail-safe modes of operation. 
The contingency management system should monitor and report the health of the 
J-UCAS and MCS as well as the status of mission parameters.  The COS should 
incorporate a system status architecture which allows autonomous on-board analysis, top-
level mission control station monitoring, and in-depth mission control station analysis.  
The J-UCAS should provide a primitive survival mode, capable of self-diagnosis and 
compensation.  This will allow the J-UCAS to respond to problems such as temporary 
data-link loss or loss of on-board computer systems that could interrupt MCS command 
and control.  Autonomous return to base routing shall be executed when conditions 
exceed pre-authorized parameters and self-diagnosed flight termination should be 
executed for catastrophic system failures. 
 
Battle Management System 
The J-UCAS battle management system should provide for the common 
operational picture of the J-UCAS in the battlespace and provide J-UCAS operators with 
decision aids and the interface necessary for integrated fire control in a joint environment.  
This system should balance autonomy with MITL interlock requirements for weapons 
employment authorization.  The J-UCAS should incorporate an autonomous self-defense 
capability for defense against pop-up threats.  The J-UCAS battle management system 
should provide an acceptable balance between lethality and survivability to ensure the 
greatest potential for mission accomplishment.  Towards this goal, this system must 
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provide adequate redundancy to manage system failures and provide degraded 
operational capability to ensure the highest levels of lethality and survivability possible. 
The J-UCAS must provide for situational awareness derived from a synthesis of 
on-board and off-board sensors to provide integrated targeting information to the mission 
control station and enable precise location of targets and threats.  The MCS should 
provide the capability to dynamically re-target weapon system assignments in flight for 
weapon release/employment.  The target acquisition capability should be able to search, 
detect, track, identify, and prioritize multiple targets at tactically significant ranges to the 
accuracy required to cue and employ weapons in adverse weather, day or night.  
Integration of on-board and/or off-board systems shall provide positive, timely, and 
reliable identification of hostile, friendly, and neutral forces.  The identification process 
shall provide accurate information in sufficient time to allow employment of associated 
weapons at ranges that ensure force effectiveness and prevent fratricide. 
The J-UCAS offensive weapons system integration should be capable of 
enhancing the lethality of the aircraft against anticipated ground targets.  Weapons 
employment capability is currently focused on employing existing conventional 1,000-
pound class JDAM munitions against ground targets.  The J-UCAS must also strive to 
incorporate the capabilities of emerging weapons technologies including small smart 
munitions that will allow these smaller aircraft to attack multiple targets during a single 
mission and reduce the cost-per-target killed.  The Miniaturized Munitions Technology 
Demonstration (MMTD) goal is to produce 250-pound class munitions effective against a 
majority of hardened targets previously vulnerable only to 2,000-pound class munitions.  
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A differential GPS/INS system will provide precision guidance, and smart fusing 
techniques will aid in producing a high probability of target kill. 56 
The J-UCAS defensive weapons system integration should be capable of 
enhancing the survivability of the aircraft against anticipated threats in a balanced 
approach to reduce vehicle signature and employ autonomous defensive capability.  
Primary consideration for vehicle signature reduction should be given to radio frequency 
(RF) and infra-red (IR) spectra from both surface-to-air and air-to-air threats.  Pre-
planned defensive responses should incorporate electronic support and advanced counter 
measures to include on-board jammers, expendables, towed decoy systems or other 
innovative methods for surviving enemy actions. 
The J-UCAS should fully exploit current and developing technologies, materials, 
and treatments in RF, IR, visual, and acoustic signature reduction.  Low life cycle cost 
technologies, long term storage, logistics support, and maintenance requirements shall be 
considered as a driving parameter in signature design.  Signature reduction features shall 
be compatible with long term storage without degradation and/or special maintenance 
requirements.  It is desired that the J-UCAS eliminate, reduce, mask, or diffuse any or all 
electronic emissions to reduce the probability of detection, tracking, or engagement by a 
threat. 
 
                                                        
56 John Pike, “X-45 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle,” Global Security.org, updated 30 June 2004, available 
on-line at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ucav.htm; Internet; accessed 28 
November 2004. 
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A new vision – putting it all together 
This analysis applied a systems-engineering approach that initially resolved 
desired UCAV mission requirements followed by the association of performance 
capabilities and then related these to the development of critical aviation systems.  These 
critical aviation systems should all be capable of MITL and autonomous command and 
control; designed to operate in a joint environment in coordination with manned aircraft 
of flexible, multi-mission capability to include intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance; suppression of enemy air defenses and strike.  This approach provided 
the foundations for a new vision for the J-UCAS acquisition program and clear strategy 
on how to integrate unmanned combat air vehicles into the Armed Forces and the future 
battlespace.
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CHAPTER V 
FUTURE CHALLENGES 
 
If the DoD is to remain committed to near-term UCAV deployment the J-UCAS 
acquisition program must overcome an array of policy, programmatic, technological, and 
operational challenges.  It is critically important to identify these challenges early for two 
reasons.  First and foremost, it is to be expected that the earlier these challenges are 
identified the more effectively they can be overcome.  Second, as we shall see the 
identification of these challenges will serve to further resolve the most appropriate 
strategy for integration of the J-UCAS into the Armed Services and combat environment. 
 
Policy challenges 
Policy challenges are those challenges that involve the influence of technological 
innovation on U.S. National Security Policy and National Military Strategy.  These 
challenges engage the highest levels of government and the Defense Department.  Policy 
challenges include the classification of UCAV weapons systems, employment of 
autonomous lethality and international collaboration. 
 
Classification of UCAV Weapon Systems 
The classification of UCAV weapon systems includes their applicability under the 
guidelines of current and future arms control agreements.  This challenge could have 
significant ramifications on future policy and programmatic decisions and operational 
employment.  Conventional arms control agreements such as the Conventional Forces in 
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Europe (CFE) Treaty will have to determine whether to classify UCAVs as systems to be 
counted under existing definitions of combat aircraft or to amend these classifications to 
account for a new category of weapon systems. 57  The DoD and Armed Services must 
remain involved with national policy makers to keep them aware of the implications of 
entering into any agreements that might compromise the strategic and operational 
advantage of the J-UCAS acquisition program. 
 
Employment of Autonomous Lethality 
The employment of autonomous lethality includes how UCAV weapons 
employment decisions will be controlled in the combat environment.  This challenge has 
international political implications and will also have significant ramifications on future 
policy and programmatic decisions as well as operational employment.  It is imperative 
that the J-UCAS weapon system be designed with the capability for a MITL decision-
maker to apply the applicable rules of engagement and criteria consistent with the Law of 
Armed Conflict immediately prior to the execution of each and every weapons 
employment decision.  The J-UCAS weapon system should be integrated with the Armed 
Forces and employed in the combat environment with this mindset.  Only after 
successfully proving its operational capability should increasing the levels of autonomous 
                                                        
57 The CFE Treaty, signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, by the 22 members of NATO and the former 
Warsaw Pact nations, is a landmark arms control agreement that established parity in major conventional 
armed forces between Eastern and Western Europe.  The CFE Treaty sets equal limits on key conventional 
armaments essential for conducting surprise attacks or initiating large-scale offensive operations.  These 
armaments/equipment include: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery pieces, as well as 
combat aircraft (except for naval air) and attack helicopters. See “Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE) Treaty,” Fact Sheet, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.: 18 June 
2002, available on-line at  http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/11243.htm; Internet accessed 1 January 2005. 
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lethality even be considered with the requirement of remaining compliant with the rules 
of engagement (ROE) and the Law of Armed Conflict. 58 
 
International Collaboration 
The degree of international collaboration includes partnerships established during 
the development and employment of the J-UCAS weapon system.  These coordinated 
efforts should be carefully considered to take advantage of additional sources of 
technological and capital investment without compromising our national security 
interests.  Another advantage of cooperation with our allied partners is ensuring joint 
interoperability.  It is anticipated that the UCAV development under this program will 
incorporate advanced technologies that require special security protection.  Provisions 
must be made to ensure classified technologies are not compromised.  Any prospective 
partnerships must be carefully vetted to ensure a stable alliance and the appropriate 
qualifications necessary to develop and operate these advanced technologies throughout 
the J-UCAS acquisition process and operational employment. 
 
Programmatic challenges 
Programmatic challenges are those challenges that confront the execution of the 
J-UCAS program vision and strategy.  These challenges engage the Defense Department 
                                                        
58 Rod Powers, “Law of Armed Conflict,” U.S. Military About, updated January 2005, available on-line at 
http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm; Internet; accessed 1 January 2005. Rules of engagement 
describe the circumstances and limitations under which armed forces will begin or continue to engage in 
combat.  ROE establish criteria that must be satisfied by the weapon systems operator before weapons may 
be employed.  The Law of Armed Conflict consists of rules adopted under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and previous for all nation-state armed forces engaged in combat governing the use of force based upon 
military necessity, distinction and proportionality. 
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and the J-UCAS Program Office.  The most daunting programmatic challenges are those 
facing the DoD to include bridging the capability gap of existing weapon systems, 
managing conflicting armed service requirements, and determining the correct force mix.  
Programmatic challenges facing the J-UCAS Program Office include balancing the 
traditional program metrics of cost, schedule, performance, and risk. 
 
Bridging the Operational Capability Gap of Existing Weapon Systems 
The DoD and J-UCAS Program Office must overcome the challenge of 
successfully bridging the operational capability gap of existing weapon systems to 
maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of both manned combat 
aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles.  These attributes are the elements of persistence, 
lethality, survivability, and flexibility.  These elements must be continuously applied 
through a new vision and clear strategy towards the development of J-UCAS 
performance capabilities and critical aviation systems. 
 
Managing Conflicting Armed Service Requirements 
The DoD and J-UCAS Program Office must overcome the challenge of managing 
conflicting Armed Services requirements to ensure we build a J-UCAS weapon system 
that extends beyond individual “service-centric” mission requirements.  This weapon 
system must be built from the outset with the inherent capability to perform all these 
missions and the flexibility to perform those that have not yet been identified.  The DoD 
must account for resistance on the part of the Armed Services to invest in future weapon 
systems out of concern that it could jeopardize funding for current weapon systems 
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programs.  The DoD must also account for a cultural bias on the part of the Armed 
Services to avoid investment in unmanned capabilities at the expense of current manned 
systems.  These challenges raise a host of secondary policy issues as budgetary realities 
require program decisions. 
 
Determining the Correct Force Mix 
The DoD and J-UCAS Program Office must overcome the challenge of 
determining the correct force mix between manned combat aircraft, unmanned combat air 
vehicles, and cruise missiles.  This particular challenge will require the Congress, the 
Defense Department, and the Armed Services to make a careful assessment of existing 
and future weapon system capabilities in order to make critical funding decisions.  These 
decisions will have to be made based upon an assessment of J-UCAS program 
development and future program potential.  This becomes a very daunting challenge 
because the implication of “getting it wrong” could mean a temporary reduction or even 
permanent loss of combat capability. 
 
Balancing Cost, Schedule, Performance, and Risk 
The DoD and J-UCAS Program Office must overcome the challenge of balancing 
the traditional program metrics of cost, schedule, performance, and risk.  These metrics 
are often difficult to gauge so early in an acquisition program’s development.  The J-
UCAS Program Office must represent the DoD and continuously interface between the 
Armed Services and defense contractors to manage the delicate balance between keeping 
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the J-UCAS program under cost, on schedule, and within desired performance criteria 
while actively seeking to reduce program risk. 
 
Technological challenges 
Technological challenges are those challenges resulting from difficulties with the 
infusion of modern science and emerging technology.  These challenges will engage the 
J-UCAS Program Office and defense contractors.  This section will identify those 
technological challenges that have the most significant impact on performance 
capabilities and the producibility of critical aviation systems.  Failure to address these 
challenges could jeopardize the achievement of a J-UCAS weapon system that provides a 
distinct strategic and operational advantage.  Technological challenges include command 
and control, communications, weapons employment, aerial refueling, and CV suitability. 
 
Command and Control 
The J-UCAS Program Office must incorporate the development of a reliable and 
redundant command and control system capable of MITL and autonomous command and 
control.  Accounting for the development of sense and avoid technology in flight control 
and navigation systems that will enable safe operation of these vehicles in airspace used 
heavily by civilian transport, in times of peace as well as war.  New airspace/air traffic 
aids to navigation must network UCAVs into the broader airspace system without 
degrading other airspace users in terms of flexibility, responsiveness, and proximate 
engagement. These technologies must also include automated landing and ground/deck 
operating capabilities.  These requirements present a particularly daunting challenge to 
 63 
the Navy which must operate aircraft in close proximity in a heavily congested and 
hazardous operating environment.  Likewise, these requirements will present even greater 
challenges to the operation of these aircraft in international and domestic airspace. 
 
Communications 
The J- UCAS Program Office must incorporate the development of 
communication systems to enable intra- and inter-operability of the J-UCAS weapon 
system.  Internal communication must incorporate resource management, prognostic and 
health management systems that are capable of providing an adequate level of 
redundancy, failure protection, and degraded operation.  External communications must 
provide robust and jam resistant communications of sufficient bandwidth and security, 
capable of beyond line-of-site communications that will not overwhelm the existing 
infrastructure. 
 
Weapons Employment 
The J- UCAS Program Office must incorporate the design and integration of 
weapons employment systems that build adequate situational awareness to search, detect, 
and track enemy air and surface threats and targets to ensure its own lethality and 
survivability.  These systems must incorporate advanced electro-optical, infrared, and 
radio frequency (EO/IR/RF) passive and active sensors.  These sensors must be 
integrated to provide for accurate target detection, designation, and engagement for 
moving and stationary, airborne and ground targets.  These systems must afford on-board 
signal processing, decision aids, and wideband data network links that afford a 
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satisfactory mix of autonomous operation and MITL decision-making.  Airframes and 
systems must be survivable against more capable air- and ground-based countermeasures, 
including missiles, gunfire, or energy-based weapons. 
 
Aerial Refueling 
The J- UCAS Program Office must incorporate the design and integration of an 
aerial refueling capability to ensure persistence and mission flexibility.  Aerial refueling 
has been identified as a critical aviation system that provides the performance capability 
of extended range/endurance which directly correlates to mission flexibility.  The Armed 
Services must work together to identify and resolve the issues related to interoperability 
in a joint environment and with manned aircraft.  This performance capability should 
receive every bit as much focus and attention as weapons employment capabilities. 
 
CV Suitability 
The J- UCAS Program Office must incorporate the design and integration of CV 
suitability systems to ensure safe and expeditious carrier operations.  Specific CV 
suitability challenges include launch and recovery operations in addition to movement 
and storage on carrier flight and hangar decks.  Current steam catapult launch and 
arresting gear equipment has not been designed for lightweight aircraft.  UCAV carrier 
launch operations will require modification of current carrier catapult system to integrate 
with J-UCAS requirements.  The J-UCAS will also have to be designed and properly 
maintained to ensure the harsh corrosive carrier operating environment. 
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Aircraft carrier recovery operations present particularly unique challenges.  To 
begin with the Navy must resolve the challenge of UCAV aerial refueling in the carrier 
environment.  Current Navy aircraft systems are not properly equipped to refuel 
unmanned aircraft in flight.  It is absolutely essential that aircraft carrier launch and 
recovery operations retain the flexibility to aerial refuel all recovering aircraft.  Carrier 
approach and recovery operations frequently encounter unexpected delays as a result of 
weather, sea state, mechanical malfunction, and human error.  A UCAV without the 
flexibility to extend its flight duration whenever required quickly becomes a liability 
particularly when operating in the carrier environment when no alternative landing 
options are available.  Even if the carrier is operating in the vicinity of divert airfields, 
these bases will require suitable UCAV approach, landing, and ground handling systems. 
Aircraft carrier recovery operations conclude with the carrier arrestment.  The 
integration of UCAV weapon systems will require the complete replacement of current 
carrier arresting gear equipment.  The mechanical inertia of current Mk7 Mod 3 carrier 
arresting gear places unacceptable constraints on the design of lightweight air vehicles 
due to its imparting excessive structural loads.  New arresting gear development is in 
progress, but initial-operational capability is not expected until 2014 based upon on retro-
fit on CVN-68 (Nimitz) and forward-fit on CVN-21 class carriers with full-operational 
capability not expected until three years later. 59 
Finally, the movement and storage of the J-UCAS on the carrier flight deck will 
require precise command and control in order to expeditiously proceed to the catapult on 
                                                        
59 “Capabilities Development Document for Advanced Arresting Gear (2nd Draft)”, OPNAV N8, Pentagon, 
Washington D.C.: 3 August 2004, pp. 7-8, 19. U.S. Navy identifies need for replacement of existing Mk 7 
Mod 3 carrier arresting gear. 
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launch and clear the landing area on recovery so as not to impede ongoing operations.  
The aircraft carrier has very limited real estate and movements between aircraft on the 
flight deck will require tremendous command and control precision on the order of inches 
between multi-million dollar aircraft with hazardous explosives and dangerous jet intake 
and exhaust in close proximity to personnel. 
 
Operational challenges 
Operational challenges are those challenges that affect our ability to integrate the 
J-UCAS weapon system into the Armed Services and combat environment.  These 
challenges will be the direct descendents from our ability or inability to overcome 
previously identified technological challenges.  These challenges will engage the Defense 
Department, the J-UCAS Program Office and the Armed Services.  Operational 
challenges include Proving Operational Capability and Integration with the Armed 
Services. 
 
Proving Operational Capability 
The J-UCAS must prove its operational capability, beyond its potential to be cost 
effective and reduce risk.  The J-UCAS must justify that it is at least as effective as 
manned combat aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles in terms of its effectiveness and 
suitability in the combat environment.  Roles and missions for the J-UCAS must be 
determined and prioritized.  They must be proven with a carefully phased approach to 
ensure the highest chances for the programs success.  Proving its operational capability 
must necessarily follow a “walk-before-you-run” approach.  While the UCAV may seem 
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destined to perform high-risk missions it must first prove its operational suitability to 
integrate in the combat environment. 
 
Integration with the Armed Services 
The J-UCAS must pursue a well conceived approach to integration with the 
Armed Services.  In today’s combat environment where joint interoperability is not only 
desired, but required, the J-UCAS must not impose any impediments to crossing the lines 
of air, land, and maritime combat operations.  It is feared that the current lack of 
coordination between the Armed Services presents the greatest challenge to producing a 
UCAV with the required level of joint interoperability.  The pursuit of the individual 
Armed Services towards the development of “service-centric” UCAVs coupled with a 
general lack of DoD oversight foreshadows an ominous future. 
Proper planning for integration with the Armed Services must begin during the 
initial stages of development.  This planning must involve the coordinated efforts of both 
the Air Force and Navy with inputs from the other Armed Services to build a UCAV that 
can eliminate all barriers in the combat environment.  The plan must account for a 
carefully phased approach that allows for the right balance of controlled operational 
capability and maximum supportability.  The ability to overcome the initial challenges of 
integration with the Armed Services is best suited to the Air Force with support from the 
other Armed Services. 
The Navy is presented with the most significant challenges to the integration of 
the J-UCAS in the naval environment.  As previously discussed, the Navy is burdened by 
the technological challenges related to the interoperability of aerial refueling and carrier 
 68 
flight operations.  The Navy is also presented with unique logistics, maintainability, and 
supportability challenges on an aircraft carrier at sea.  The refinement of the required J-
UCAS suitability metrics to adequately address these challenges is beyond the scope of 
the test and evaluation process and can only realistically be resolved from sustained 
operations.  Adding any new logistics, maintainability, and supportability demands for 
such a “revolutionary” weapon system to an aircraft carrier at sea without clearly 
understanding these suitability requirements would be foolish at best. 
The addition of any new air vehicle to the carrier flight deck must necessarily 
result in the replacement of proven aircraft assets.  The aircraft carrier cannot afford to 
reduce its combat capability with an unproven weapon system of limited operational 
capability.  This is precisely what the J-UCAS will be until this weapon system has been 
given the opportunity to prove itself in the combat environment.  This is the principal 
reason why the Air Force should lead the Armed Services’ J-UCAS development efforts 
and field the initial operational capability.  The Navy should continue to directly support 
this effort while contributing to the resolution of the J-UCAS interoperability issues in 
the naval environment.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The pursuit of this research was guided by the desire to provide new insight for 
the DoD and Armed Services to collectively resolve a new vision and clear strategy for 
the integration of unmanned combat air vehicles into the Armed Forces and the future 
battlespace.  The motivation behind this paper was born out of the clear and present 
struggle between Congress, the Defense Department, and defense contractors to build a J-
UCAS that offers more than just a low-cost and low-risk alternative to the Armed 
Services.  This analysis applied a systems-engineering approach that initially resolved 
desired J-UCAS mission requirements followed by the association of performance 
capabilities and then related these to the development of critical aviation systems.  It is 
believed that this approach has provided the foundations for a new vision for the J-UCAS 
acquisition program and clear strategy on how to integrate unmanned combat air vehicles 
into the Armed Forces and the future battlespace. 
Why develop an unmanned air vehicle for combat?  The answer to this essential 
question laid the foundations for defining the desired mission requirements and 
performance capabilities of the J-UCAS acquisition program.   The answer…  To build a 
UCAV weapon system that provides a distinct strategic and operational advantage over 
existing weapons systems capabilities.  The UCAV program should focus on maximizing 
the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages to successfully “bridge the gap” of 
operational capability between manned combat aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles.  
These attributes have been broken down to the elements of persistence, lethality, 
survivability, and flexibility.  The UCAV program must also optimize the traditional 
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measures of cost, schedule, and performance and actively seek to reduce program risk.  
These foundations of the J-UCAS program were used to define desired mission 
requirements, performance capabilities and critical aviation systems for the J-UCAS 
acquisition program. 
The J-UCAS acquisition program vision should capture mission requirements and 
clearly identified performance capabilities.  The J-UCAS weapon system should be 
capable of MITL and autonomous command and control; designed to operate in a joint 
environment within the emerging global command and control architecture in 
coordination with manned aircraft with flexible, multi-mission capability.  The J-UCAS 
must be designed through joint cooperation from all the Armed Services with an 
emphasis on flexible, multi-mission capability to include intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance; suppression of enemy air defenses and strike.  This weapon system must 
be built from the outset with the inherent capability to perform all these missions and the 
flexibility to perform those that have not yet been identified. 
The J-UCAS Program should continue with the COS approach with an emphasis 
on the following critical aviation systems: flight control, navigation, communications, 
resource management, contingency management, and battle management.  The COS 
approach should strive to ensure intra-operability with internal J-UCAS systems and 
inter-operability with external systems to include command and control stations, other 
manned and unmanned aircraft, and space assets.   
The strategy for integration of future UCAV weapon systems into the Armed 
Forces identifies that while the J-UCAS acquisition program should remain a joint effort, 
the USAF should be given the priority on developing and fielding the first operational 
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UCAV weapon system.  The Air Force presents the right balance to meet the demands of 
a strategy for integration with the Armed Services that allows for the greatest flexibility 
to demonstrate operational effectiveness and suitability.  The Air Force is better poised to 
meet the needs of a carefully phased approach.  The Navy should directly support this 
effort, but initially limit their contributions to evaluating technology demonstrators that 
primarily focus on interoperability in their respective combat environment until such time 
as the first operational UCAV program has successfully proven its combat effectiveness. 
While the individual Armed Services may identify different requirements for 
specific mission capabilities, the J-UCAS must be designed from the very beginning with 
an inherent capacity to support all mission areas to the maximum extent possible.  The 
Armed Services have identified critical mission capabilities including the roles of ISR, 
SEAD, and strike.  The Armed Services can certainly choose to integrate the J-UCAS in 
a carefully phased approach that appropriately applies the desired combat capability for 
each service and at the same time affords the J-UCAS the best opportunity to prove their 
combat effectiveness in given mission areas. 
Future policy and programmatic decisions that remain unanswered concerning 
force structure ratios and the replacement of manned aircraft should be made once the 
UCAV has demonstrated its potential in the operational environment for which it is 
designed.  For now, the UCAV must be afforded the best chances for integration into the 
Armed Services.  This will require a carefully phased approach to both demonstrate 
operational effectiveness and assess operational suitability.  Failure to take this approach 
may result in possible loss of combat capability for the DoD and Armed Services. 
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The establishment of the J-UCAS Program Office to lead the individual Armed 
Services in a single joint program and capitalize on the synergy of existing efforts was a 
step in the right direction.  However, a subsequent failure of the Defense Department, the 
Armed Services, and the J-UCAS Program Office to take the next step to conduct a 
careful reassessment of the current J-UCAS vision and strategy could jeopardize program 
cost, schedule, and performance and might result in missed opportunities.  This shortfall 
could result in a loss of combat capability for the DoD and Armed Services that would 
deny the warfighter the distinct strategic and operational advantage they deserve.
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
Figure A-1 
Boeing X-45A Demonstrator 
 
Source: Internet: “J-UCAS Program Overview,” November 2004.
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Figure A-2 
Boeing X-45B Prototype 
 
Source: Internet: “J-UCAS Program Overview,” November 2004. 
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Figure A-3 
Boeing X-45C / Northrop Grumman X-47B Prototype 
 
Source: Internet: “J-UCAS Program Overview,” November 2004. 
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Figure B-1 
DoD Acquisition Process 
 
Source: Briefing, subject: Systems Engineering Fundamentals, (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition 
University Press, January 2001). 
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Figure C-1 
The Systems Engineering Process 
 
Source: Briefing, subject: Systems Engineering Fundamentals, (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition 
University Press, January 2001).
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Figure C-2 
System Development and Demonstration 
 
Source: Briefing, subject: Systems Engineering Fundamentals, (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition 
University Press, January 2001).
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